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         When Risk-Based Regulation Aims Low: Part I – Approaches and Challenges 
 
Abstract 
Risk based regulation is becoming a familiar regulatory strategy in a wide range of areas 
and countries.   Regulatory attention tends to focus, at least initially, on high risks but 
low-risk regulatees or activities tend to form the bulk of the regulated population. In the 
context of expanding remits and shrinking budgets, regulators are turning their attention 
to how to manage such risks, and in short, asking ‘how low can they go’ in regulating 
them.  The first part of this article examines the particular issues that arise with respect to 
selecting and managing low risks, and considers how regulators tend to deal with lower 
risks in practice.
 
 The second part, published in the subsequent issue of this journal, then 
develops a strategic framework for regulators to employ when choosing intervention 
strategies and it assesses whether, and how, such a framework could be used by 




In a striking wave of regulatory homogenisation, risk-based regulation is becoming 
widespread across the globe and in areas as diverse as environment, finance, food and 
legal services (Black 2005a; Hutter 2005; Hampton Report 2005; Rothstein et al. 2006; 
Black 2005b; Black 2006; Hutter & Lloyd Bostock 2008).   Risk-based regulation is a 
particular strategy or set of strategies that regulators use to target their resources at those 
sites and activities that present threats to their ability to achieve their objectives (Black 
2005a; Black 2008; Black & Baldwin 2010). In such an approach, the tendency is for 
regulators’ gaze to be drawn to their highest risks.  High risks, however, tend to be 
concentrated in a relatively small proportion of firms or activities and the bulk of 
regulated sites and operations tend to present lower levels of risk. Risk-based regulation 
encourages regulators to pull back resources from these latter risks, but most regulators 
need to deal with lower risks in some way or other.  Such risks have some capacity to 
produce both significant harms and political contention, and in many cases the law will 
demand that lower risks be attended to.   
         Regulators, therefore, cannot ignore low risks, but such risks pose a very real set of 
questions for them. How far can they pull back from actively intervening with respect to 
low risk sites or activities? Can they control low risks with strategies that are low 
resource, but also efficient, effective, transparent and justifiable to those both within and 
outside the agency?  How do they ‘go low’, and indeed ‘how low can they go’, when 
addressing low risks? 
This article examines the particular challenges that regulators have to face when 
overseeing low risks, and Part II seeks to develop a strategic framework for regulators to 
use in determining how to regulate lower risk sites or activities. The framework offered is 
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derived from a research project conducted for, and in conjunction with, the four 
environment regulators of England and Wales, Northern Ireland, Scotland and the 
Republic of Ireland.
1
 The discussion commences by asking why regulators need to 
address low risks and it outlines the potential difficulties that such risks present. It then 
considers, in Section 2, how regulators tend to deal with lower risks in practice.
2
 A body 
of literature and survey-based research is used, in Section 3, to develop a taxonomy of 
intervention strategies that may be potentially useful in relation to low-risk activities, and, 
indeed, more widely.   
Identifying a range of possible intervention strategies does not in itself, however, 
provide a framework for strategic decisions. Part II Section 1, therefore, develops such a 
framework for regulators to employ when choosing low-risk intervention strategies and 
for reviewing such selection processes.  It is important to stress that the framework is not 
proposed as a complete framework for risk governance.  Rather it focuses principally on 
part of that process: the selection and implementation of regulatory strategies (or tools of 
risk management) and a framework for  review.  The intervention framework does not 
cover in detail the processes of goal setting, risk selection, assessment, and 
categorisation, though it does propose a secondary assessment process and it argues that 
the distinctions between these stages are in practice blurred for a number of reasons 
which are explained.  Part II Section 2 then assesses whether, and how, such a framework 
could be used by regulatory agencies in a manner that is operable, dynamic, transparent 
and justifiable. Finally, Part II Section 3 argues that coming to grips with the challenges 




1. The Challenges of Low Risks  
 
There are a number of challenges involved in developing and implementing systems to 
manage risks (eg Renn 1992; Hood C et al. 2001; Sunstein, 2002; Kasperson et al. 2003; 
Renn 2005) and, more specifically, in developing and implementing the particular 
strategy of risk-based regulation (Black 2005a; Hutter 2005; Rothstein et al. 2006; Black 
2005b; Black 2006; Hutter & Lloyd Bostock 2008; Black 2008; Black & Baldwin 2010).  
Each aspect of a risk-based framework involves a complex set of choices and risk-based 
regulators have to address a number of issues including: the risks they will identify as 
requiring attention; the indicators and methods they will use to assess those risks; where 
they will prioritise their attention and where they will not. They will also have to decide 
how the implementation of the risk-based framework will be managed; how it will be 
justified and communicated both internally and externally; how they will respond to 
changes and, ultimately, what level of risk or failure they are prepared to accept. 
3 
 
            These challenges are well documented and will not be rehearsed here.  Our 
present focus rests on the particular challenges of regulating those firms, sites or activities 
that fall at the lower end of a regulator’s risk spectrum. ‘Low’ should, therefore, be read 
as synonymous with ‘lower’.  The main such challenges are: first, whether and how to 
fine-tune risk categorisations in a manner that distinguishes the very low from the low or 
medium-low risks; second, to determine what level of regulatory attention to give to 
lower risks; and third, to develop a justifiable strategy for intervention and review.  
 
Distinguishing lower from higher risks 
In conventional risk analyses, risks are distinguished from hazards.  A hazard is the 
inherent potential for harm arising from a substance, structure or activity; risk is the 
potential effects of that hazard on a particular target and its related probabilities (Renn 
2005 p. 19).  In turn, ‘risk’ is distinguished from ‘uncertainty’: the former is used where 
probabilities are known, the latter where they are not (Knight 1921).  Levels of risk are 
conventionally assessed as the product of the quantum of a potential harm and the 
probability that the harm will be realized (Renn 2005), an assessment also used in risk 
based regulation (Black 2005a).
3
  
Just how risks are  categorised is a matter of some debate both in academic and 
policy circles. In most of the  risk based frameworks that are encountered across sectors 
and countries, risks are ranked in order of priority from ‘low’ to ‘high’ with various 
stages in between (most frameworks employ four or five  categorisations or ‘levels’  of 
risk).  Some may dispute the appropriateness of categorisation in terms of ‘levels’ of risk, 
arguing that it does not make sense to hold something to be a ‘low’ or ‘high’ risk and 
preferring instead to categorise risks on the basis of other dimensions including and 
simplicity, complexity, uncertainty of estimates of probability and / or impact, and socio-
political contestability (eg Renn 2005; WBGU 2000).  Whatever  type of characterisation 
is used, though, regulatory agencies still need to prioritise the different risks that they 
have to manage and, in practice, categorisations of ‘low’ or ‘medium-low’ or ‘high’ 
operate as prioritisation categories.  ‘Low risk’ means ‘low priority’ – it is not so much a 
characterisation of the risk itself as a statement of a risk’s relative significance for the 
organisation (which may or may not equate to its risk to the environment, food safety, 
financial stability or other matter that the agency is charged with ensuring, protecting, 
contributing to).   
As is well recognised in the risk literature, how risks are selected, framed and 
categorised for attention is a complex process, involving a mosaic of technical, 
psychological, cultural, social, political, organisational and economic concerns.  The 
categorisation decisions made in risk-based regulation are no exception.   Distinguishing 
‘low’ from ‘high’ risks is therefore an art rather than a science, notwithstanding the 
prevalence of scientific analysis and quantitative risk models in much risk regulation.  
Most importantly, there is no single and uncontentious way to define and ‘rate’ many 
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risks – what is a ‘low risk’ or a ‘high risk’ is a matter of construction. Risk assessments, 
moreover, are usually relative – what counts as a ‘low’ risk for one regulator may be seen 
as a ‘high’ risk by another because of differences in the overall risk profile of the 
regulated population.  
In addition, what constitutes ‘low’ and ‘high’ in risk-based regulation is usually 
defined in terms of the risks to the agency not attaining its objectives or mandate.  Risk-
based regulation is a strategy of institutional risk management, and like many risk 
assessments can be significantly affected by the socio-political context, organisational 
factors and the regulator’s own risk appetite.  It is important to emphasise that in risk 
based regulation, organisational factors can be important in constructing and applying 
risk categorisations.  A key use of the risk categorisations is to determine or at least 
facilitate resource management (Black 2005a).  As noted above, categorising something 
as a ‘high’ risk means it is a ‘high priority’ risk to be addressed with a high level of 
resourcing.  The link between risk categorisation and resources can, moreover, skew the 
risk assessment in a number of ways.  Divisions within a regulatory agency can ‘bid up’ 
their risks to attract more resources.  Alternatively (or additionally), a regulatory body 
may tend to define only as many ‘high’ risks as it knows it has resources to manage 
(Black 2005a). Conversely, if a charging scheme is linked to a risk categorisation (so that 
those firms categorised as ‘higher’ risks pay more fees, as is the case in the 
environmental regulators examined here), then the agency’s own need to gain resources 
can be an important factor in the categorisation process and may drive more firms into 
the higher risk categories. 
Thus, for a number of reasons, what is a low risk to one regulator in one context 
might not be treated as such in another set of circumstances.   In the environmental 
sector, the types of risks that we refer to as being ‘low’ risk include sites and activities 
such as point source discharges into water, waste transfer stations, small oil pumping and 
container sites, septic tanks, dry cleaners.   However, as our research discovered,  
regulators may agree that such activities are ‘low’ risk, but they can still disagree quite 
significantly on whether diffuse pollution from agriculture, for example, or peat 
harvesting, or coal-fired power stations could also be considered  ‘low’ risks.   
Our concern here is not to seek to identify a precise point at which a risk should 
turn from ‘low’ to ‘medium-low’, medium-high’, ‘high’ and so forth in the regulators’ 
classification scheme, nor would such a prescription necessarily be productive.     What is 
addressed in this article is the set of problems that many regulators face in dealing with 
the risks that they have put in their lower risk categorisations. A first challenge is posed 
by the very numbers of sites or activities that give rise to lower risks. We, accordingly, 
ask, first, whether it is possible and / or useful to further break the ‘low risk’ category 
down in order to devise appropriate regulatory strategies for managing those risks.  
 
Distinguishing between types of low risks 
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There are a number of different ways to categorise risks, as noted above.  Risks are 
conventionally categorised on the basis of two dimensions: probability and impact, with 
impact often defined as an adverse event of different degrees of tolerability.
4
 In the 
activity of risk governance, however, other dimensions come into play, including the 
simplicity or complexity of the causal chain between hazard and harm, the degree to 
which probability and / or impact are known or uncertain, the nature and distribution of 
the impacts (remediable or irremediable, concentrated or diffused) and the socio-political 
contestability of the risk (eg Renn 2005).  Different strategies may be appropriate for 
risks which are known and simple and whose impacts are remediable or reversible than 
for those which are uncertain and / or highly contestable whose impacts are ireemediable 
or irreversible (Wildavksy 1988; O’Riordan & Cameron 2002; Majone 2002; Klinke & 
Renn 2002).   
It is suggested here that two further dimensions are important for regulators in 
managing all levels of risks, not only low risks.  These are the extent to which a risk is 
stable or volatile, including the extent to which it may accumulate to present an overall 
higher risk, and whether what is being assessed is ‘intrinsic’ or ‘net’ risk.  Thus, the risks 
presented by some activities may be ‘intrinsically’ low because the quantum of the 
potential harm that might ensue is not high even in the absence of any risk control 
measures.  Others may be categorized for the purposes of risk governance as ‘net low 
risks’: where the potential harm is higher than for the intrinsically lower risks, but the 
probability and / or impact is reduced by risk management and other control measures, or 
by systems of resilience – such as capital requirements in financial institutions, or 
engineered safety controls in power stations, or by the possibility of remediation (eg 
compensation for financial loss, treatment for disease, or environmental ‘clean up’).  
Assessments of ‘net’ risk are common in risk based regulation in the financial sphere, for 
example (Black 2010).  
With respect to the dynamic dimension (volatility and accumulation) of risk, an 
important issue for risk governance purposes is the time horizon over which control 
measures are being applied and assessed.  A key issue for most regulators will be whether 
a given risk is liable to change materially in the period between their reviews of strategies 
for dealing with it. That ‘review period’ is, thus, the logical temporal scale to be used in 
assessing volatility.  A risk may be relatively stable with respect to either quantum of 
potential harm or probability of occurrence over a defined period of time, or it may be 
subject to change. In the case of water pollution, for instance, the level of a potential 
harm may vary with climatic conditions or water levels. Alternatively, the managerial 
team that controls a risk may be liable to change, altering the probability of harm 
occurring, and constituting a matter of key concern for ‘net’ risk assessments. 
It is also the case that, although individually a particular site or activity may pose 
a small risk, that risk may be generated by a large number of actors so that it accumulates 
to form higher, possibly systemic risks – as where thousands of farmers each discharge 
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small quantities of effluent into a water course as the result of a commonly adopted 
operation (e.g. the cleaning of milking parlours or fertiliser run-off from fields). This 
process of accumulation may, moreover, render an otherwise stable risk volatile: the risk 
becomes more substantial as accumulations cross thresholds of tolerance or create 
systemic problems. 
   A key related issue here is how risks are defined or ‘bundled’ by the regulator in 
its analytical and monitoring processes, for that bundling can reveal or obscure risks, 
depending on how it is done.  If risks are assessed in terms of risks arising from 
individual sites, the actions from any single small farm present a very low risk. However 
if risks are categorised according to activity, the widely practiced operation presents a 
huge risk.   Parallels can be drawn with other regulatory domains: in the food sector, meat 
from one contaminated source can quickly be distributed into thousands of meat products 
sold through further thousands of venues, often in different countries.  In the financial 
sector, such accumulations may involve a systemic threat in so far as they prejudice 
overall stability of the financial system or investor confidence.  
A fundamental difficulty in scoring low-risks with any precision is that the 
evaluation process can consume considerable agency resources.  It may be justifiable to 
engage in close-grained analysis of higher risks, but it will be less easy to justify the 
devotion of higher resource levels to evaluating risks that are at the lower end of the 
agency’s risk spectrum. Any categorization for firms in the low-risk category is, 
accordingly, likely to have to be broad brush. It can similarly be difficult to justify higher 
levels of monitoring activity with respect to lower risks. A central message of risk-based 
regulation is, after all, to pull back from spending resources on the lower risks.  A core 
challenge for any risk-based regulator is thus to deploy low cost approaches to lower 
risks and yet be able to pick up accumulations of such risks when they become an issue 
without expending significant amounts of resources, a matter to which we return below. 
Within any regulatory agency, moreover, there may be a number of different risk 
categorisations in operation (these are often driven by the legal frameworks which the 
agencies have to apply).  This is particularly the case in the environmental sector, where 
regulators in the UK and Ireland have to implement separate legal frameworks for waste 
management, water quality, emissions to air and a number of other discrete 
environmental risks.  The risk-based framework can be more developed for some 
activities (e.g. pollution control) than others (e.g. waste or water quality).
6
 Developing a 
single, unified method of assessing and scoring risks across the whole of the agency’s 
remit can be challenging as the risks can be difficult to compare and render 
commensurable, though not impossible: SEPA (the Scottish Environmental Protection 
Agency) has recently developed such a unified approach, an essential first step in 
developing a coherent framework for establishing priorities for action. 
Even a unified framework can leave a large ‘bulge’ in the low risk category. This 
prompts the question whether it is possible to develop a typology of low risks which can 
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be applied across the agencies’ different legal mandates, which can help regulators to 
disaggregate the large numbers of firms, sites or activities which fall into this category, 
and which captures some of these complexities, but is still practical?  It is suggested here 
that this can be done.  If it is assumed that the broad category of low risks contains those 
which are relatively simple, the main characteristics are relatively well-known, the harm 
is relatively remediable or reversible, and the risk is relatively uncontested, then we can 
differentiate this broad category by focusing primarily on two dimensions: the volatility 
and propensity to accumulate of the risks, and the degree to which the  categorisations of 
those risks as low or high is dependent on the application of risk control measures.  The 
reason for focussing on these two dimensions is that this allows regulators to tailor their 
strategic interventions to their major concerns about lower risks: whether they are stable 
or likely to change into higher risks and whether their lower risk status is dependent on 
effective risk management by the regulatee. 
The types of risk that an agency is likely to have categorised as ‘low risk’ (ie low 
priority) are usually relatively simple in that the properties of the risk, ie, its probability, 
impact and causal relationships are relatively well known, and there is relatively little 
socio-political contestability as to the nature of the risk (though there may be as to its 
relative prioritisation for attention).   Those dimensions are therefore fairly constant (and 
indeed are likely to be within any one risk ‘band’ or category, though this is not an issue 
which we can explore further here).  Where risks within the ‘lower risk’ category differ 
relative to one another is with respect to the role of risk controls in bringing any 
particular risk down into the lower risk categorisation, and in terms of their potential to 
change, which can bring them up relative to more stable risks.   
The following table therefore develops a typology of low risks based on these 
dimensions. 
  
Table 1: Types of low risks 
 
Inherent low risk – stable The activity is not capable of producing 
intolerable harms/impacts and operations 
are not likely to change in the periods 
between regulators’ strategy reviews. 
Net low risk - stable The activity is capable of producing 
intolerable harms/impacts in the periods 
between regulators’ strategy reviews but 
risks are reduced by good management. 
Inherent low risk but may change or 
accumulate 
The activity is not capable (as presently 
organized) of producing intolerable 
harms/impacts in the periods between 
regulators’ strategy reviews but 
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operations (e.g. chemicals used) may 
change or there may be numbers of such 
risks being created that create a 
cumulative problem (e.g. because 
environmental absorption capacities are 
exceeded). 
Net low risk but may change or 
accumulate 
The activity is capable of producing 
intolerable harms/impacts in the periods 
between regulators’ strategy reviews but, 
at present, risks are reduced by good 
management. That good management 
may, however, change or there may be 
numbers of such risks being created that 




Going low – how low to go?   
As noted above, the political and functional justification for risk based regulation 
is that regulators should prioritise their resources by targetting them on those firms, sites 
or activities which pose the highest risks to their objectives (Hampton 2005; Sparrow 
2000).  Resource allocation, however, tends to be a zero-sum game.  If resources are 
moved to one area – such as higher risks- they are necessarily withdrawn from 
somewhere else.  This is a facet of risk-based regulation that chimes well with the mantra 
of ‘burden reduction’ but is frequently underplayed in the policy literature (Hampton 
2005).  
The difficulty for regulators is that there are a number of reasons why it may be 
dangerous for them to underplay lower risks by failing to control them or to keep them 
under review.  First, as noted, risks, even low risks, are dynamic.  Circumstances may 
change so that inherently low risks become higher risks because, for instance, a 
production process has changed or waste starts to accumulate at a site which previously 
had a high throughput. Low net risks may also mutate to higher risks as managers 
become complacent about, and less effective with, their risk controls, or indeed, if 
regulators reduce their inspection activities. If regulators do not operate systems that 
allow them to pick up and deal with such changes, they may fail to control very 
significant dangers.  
Secondly, the categorisations the regulator uses may be contested by those outside 
the organisation, such as NGOs, consumers, local residents, politicians, and industry.  
The result of this disjuncture may be that the regulator loses public and political support 
for not aligning its priorities with those endorsed beyond its organization. A clear 
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example in the environmental sector is noise and odours. Actions to limit noise and 
odours may not be part of the legislative responsibilities of the environmental regulator, 
and, even if they are, they pose modest risks to the environment. Noises and odours are, 
however, matters that give rise to public concern and which the public expects the 
regulator to address. It is because of such sensitivities that, in practice, a regulator’s risk 
tolerance is often materially driven by political considerations.   However, similar 
political problems may arise from the way in which the regulator has bundled risks.  As 
noted above, how a risk is bundled has implications for how it is assessed: a regulator 
may deem a risk to be low because it calculates risks with reference to individual sites or 




Thirdly, and related to the point above, risk-based regulation tends to expose a 
regulator’s risk tolerance to problematic public scrutiny.  With respect to low risks, a 
regulator has to decide ‘how low it can go’ – how far it can hold back from regulating 
lower risks, and conversely, how far it can divert resources from regulating higher risks 
in order to focus resources on less significant risks. It is not easy to defend a strategy of 
reducing regulatory attention when things go wrong. When a harm occurs at a low risk 
site, it may be difficult to explain why that site was a low priority for action, and will 
continue to be a low priority.  This may be notwithstanding evidence that suggests that 
inspections can have little effect on compliance, and longer frequencies between 
inspections have very little or no impact on the rate of ‘compliance decay’ (SNIFFER 
2009; Ko et al. 2010).  Further, as noted, what a regulator considers low risk may not be 
what the public considers to be low risk.  
Fourthly, the internal organisational context of the regulatory body itself is 
important.  Reducing the resources devoted to lower risks is a managerial challenge as 
well as a political one. Reallocating resources inevitably means that there will be winners 
and losers within the organization.  Difficult messages will therefore have to be 
communicated internally. Thus, field-officers may not be happy to be told that they can 
do their job just as effectively by inspecting once every three years as opposed to three 
times in one year.  As noted, divisions can respond by bidding up risks in an attempt to 
gain resources; alternatively officials can reduce risk categorisations as they are reluctant 
to take a more interventionist approach (Black 2010).  The case for reallocating 
resources, it should not be forgotten, has to convince those within the regulatory body as 
well as those outside it. 
Finally, it should be noted that regulators are not always free to move resources 
away from lower risks. The legislative frameworks that regulators operate under will 
commonly require them to regulate activities that their own analyses would suggest 
should be allowed to fall out of the regulatory net altogether.  
Such legal restrictions apart, it is likely that the higher the political salience of a 
sector or risk, the less will be the regulators’ tolerance of failure in that particular area. 
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Regulatory effectiveness is affected by levels of political support (Haines 2011a; Turner 
2009) and several regulators deliberately calibrate their risk models with reference, inter 
alia, to their ability to maintain public confidence in themselves and in the sector they 
are regulating (Black 2005a). The political context is often fickle, however, so that 
issues that were not salient suddenly become so, and vice versa. This has consequences 
for the allocation of resources, which may not always go where the risk model says they 
should. Rather they go to the area which is most politically sensitive (Black 2010, pp. 
332-9).  
 
 Regulators’ Responses to Low Risks 
 
In Part II of this paper (Black and Baldwin forthcoming) we develop a framework 
for regulators to use in deciding how to address the challenges presented by lower risks.  
A necessary precursor to developing such a framework, however, is to understand how, 
in the environmental sector, regulators tend currently manage such risks. It is important 
to emphasise that the aim of the research project was not to assess what the legislative 
framework should be: the policy and legislative processes at the EU and national levels 
had already determined which risks the regulators had to address.  Instead, it was to 
investigate how regulators managed the regulatory tasks they had been given with respect 
to risks which they categorised as being lower risks, and to develop a framework to help 
them to manage them better, assessed against a number of criteria.    
In general terms, the environmental regulators in the UK and Eire aspire to 
regulate low risks in a manner that serves three core objectives. Their first stated aim is to 
use resources efficiently and effectively to control these risks in a manner that serves the 
regulator’s given statutory aims. (These will generally include avoiding the imposition, or 
incurring of, disproportionate costs). Second, to operate systems that can be assessed and 
justified  - whose performance can be measured and which satisfy ‘representative’ values 
such as those of transparency, fairness, and accountability. Third, to apply approaches 
that are dynamically efficient – that can cope with change, adjust to new challenges and 
improve over time (SNIFFER 2010a). 
As part of the research for this project, a web-based survey
7
 was used to identify 
current practices and strategies relating to low risk sites.
8
 Notwithstanding the low risk 
categorisation, the survey results are consistent with many of the findings of previous 
studies into regulators’ inspection and enforcement behavior, particularly in the UK and 
Australia (Gunningham 2010, Haines 2011b; Grabosky & Braithwaite 1986; Hawkins 
2001).   (Full details of the findings including detailed breakdowns of the responses can 
be found in SNIFFER 2011).  Overall, the survey found that there were some regional 
differences in the strategies for regulating low risks.  The Irish EPA relied heavily on 
operator self-assessments, the Environment Agency for England and Wales had 
introduced a scheme of third party audits for agricultural sites and activities, the Farm 
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Assurance Scheme, and the Scottish Environmental Protection Agency (SEPA) had 
introduced a system of audits rather than inspections (these are discussed in more depth 
in the next section). Subject to those exceptions, however, regulators generally used the 
same strategies for lower risks as were employed for higher risks, namely routine 
monitoring, audit or inspection, but with a lower frequency and / or intensity.  
Enforcement and intervention actions were conducted in accordance with their agency’s 
existing enforcement policies, which emphasised the nature of the risk and the attitude 
and compliance history of the regulated operator as key factors shaping which 
enforcement and intervention tools should be adopted. A broadly ‘compliance’-orientated 
approach was preferred (relying on informal warnings, advice and assistance), but 
although prosecution was not often used, it was seen as effective. In contrast, providing 
information and guidance to firms was often used, but not seen as particularly effective in 
improving compliance. 
 
Inspection and monitoring 
The central strategies employed for regulating low risks were inspection, monitoring and 
audit.  These activities served a number of functions: they enabled the regulator to gain 
information about a regulatee, to identify potential risks or non-compliance (the two may 
not be the same), and to ‘turn’ the regulatee towards better risk management / compliance 
or provide a basis for doing so. Direct inspection and monitoring of sites / activities is 
costly, however. A critical question for regulators is what should they be looking at, and 
how often should they look. Inspection and monitoring strategies common to all the 
agencies included registration, regular reporting requirements, routine and random 
inspections and incident/complaint responding. In contrast, self-certification was not used 
frequently by the agencies in the areas surveyed, with the exception of the Irish 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), noted above, and to an extent the EA. Proxy 
measures (methods of gathering information on operators’ performance other than going 
to the site directly) were cited as seldom used by any agency.  
Common factors influencing the choice of inspection and information gathering 
methods were the compliance history and cooperation of the operator, the nature of the 
risk or level of the risk rating and resources. In addition, respondents listed deteriorating 
proxy indicators, a change in policy/legislation, and deviation from agreed self-
monitoring schemes as influential factors.    
One of the challenges of adopting risk-based approaches is coping with risk 
volatility or accumulation. Respondents indicated that their agencies were generally good 
at identifying changes in risk levels, mainly through inspections and information received 
through regular reporting requirements. The general drive to reduce ‘regulatory burdens’ 
across government was, however, hindering them in this respect. To this extent, the 
observations of the ‘really responsive’ framework are pertinent: that the institutional 
context and conflicting logics of different control instruments and regimes can impact on 
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an agency’s behavior (Black & Baldwin 2010). Some used proxies such as sampling, but 
many noted that spotting dynamic changes in risk is very challenging and often happens 
in response to complaints. 
All respondents identified limitations in the co-operation, knowledge and capacity 
of the regulated as significant challenges to monitoring and inspection, along with 
internal resources and data collection and management. The dispersion of activities 
across a large number of sites was also identified as a factor that could present 
difficulties. In order to address these challenges, many identified a need to improve 
systems of data management, in particular to consolidate record keeping systems for 
registration or licensing data and for compliance, creating an ‘end to end’ licensing and 
enforcement database, and improve data sharing with other agencies. A minority 
suggested a greater use of operator self-monitoring, though it should be noted that this is 
the dominant strategy used in Eire. One particular issue for all agencies was whether 
inspection and monitoring activities should be organized on an activity basis (e.g. 
emissions to air, water discharges, waste treatment) or on a site basis. The legislation and 
permitting system is organized on an activity basis, and most agencies used the legislative 
structure to organize their internal operational structures. As a result, one farm might be 
visited several times a year by different teams focusing on different types of activity. For 
lower risk activities this was potentially an over-use of resources.   
 
Enforcement and intervention 
A further question for the regulators of low risks is the level of resources that should be 
put into taking enforcement action in response to non-compliance with rules, particularly 
if that non-compliance does not in fact cause much, or any, environmental damage. 
Should enforcement focus on risks rather than rules, and how much time and resources 
should regulators devote to taking formal enforcement action with respect to low risk 
sites or operators?   
The agencies possessed a familiar set of enforcement tools: prosecution; statutory 
notices; informal warning; advice/assistance; and information/education. In addition, the 
EA and EPA had the power to impose fines. Advice and assistance was by far the most 
commonly applied tool in all agencies, with informal warning, civil monetary penalties 
and financial/administrative incentives all coming a close respective second, third and 
fourth. Advice and assistance was identified by a significant majority as the most 
effective approach for gaining compliance and prosecutions (along with statutory notices) 
were viewed as quite effective although they were the least commonly used. In contrast, 
information/education directed at regulated operators was often used but was not 
regarded by field officers as very effective.  There were some regional differences in 
approaches used.  For example, the EPA and SEPA more commonly use 
interdict/injunctions; the EPA is less likely to provide advice and assistance to operators 
and to use public information campaigns. The use of public information campaign was 
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cited as being greater at the NIEA than at other regulators, whereas the EA and SEPA are 
more likely to use financial/administrative incentives than the other agencies, though the 
research also found that these had also been used by the NIEA with respect to landfill 
regulations. 
For all respondents, their agency’s own enforcement policy was the main factor 
influencing their approach.
9 
Other factors commonly cited across all agencies were the 
attitude/ intent of the operator, the relevant compliance history and the level of 
environmental damage/risk or the seriousness of the breach, all of which are reflected in 
the agencies’ enforcement guidance (EA 2011). Additional considerations mentioned 
included the public / national interest, the cost-benefit analysis of the proposed remedies, 
the evidence available for demonstrating a breach, timeframes for achieving compliance, 
and the relevance of remedial action taken. Some respondents noted that they would 
escalate the severity of intervention or enforcement strategies up an ‘enforcement 
pyramid’ (Ayres & Braithwaite 1992). 
The main challenge to low-risk enforcement and intervention was identified as a 
lack of capacity by operators to comply (due, for example to inadequate record keeping, 
and/or paucity of resourcing). The difficulties of relying on incident reporting or 
complaints were also noted, as reports by the public can be inaccurate or there is a 
difference in perception between the public and the regulators regarding the severity or 
importance of a risk or event. As for operational difficulties within the agencies, 
particular challenged cited were those presented by: the information and evidence 
gathering processes; limitations in enforcement resources; and sectors offering a large 
number of sites to inspect. Finally, some responses highlighted the challenges that flowed 
from nature of the risk itself – as was said to be the case with volatile or cumulative risks. 
 
Quality of management and controls 
Responses indicated that the strength of management and controls strongly affected the 
choice of methods for gathering information and deciding how to intervene with 
enforcement actions. In addition, all regulators believed that good management was a 
strong indication of a less problematic site with a lower likelihood of permit breach. It 
also indicated that issues would be identified early, and dealt with promptly. Less 
regulatory ‘effort’ was necessary with good managements and there was both a lower 
need for inspection or formal enforcement action, and a greater potential for self-
monitoring strategies to be used in conjunction with external auditing and regulator-led 
inspections. Remedial action was also easier to plan with such managers. More flexibility 
and a less intensive intervention approach was therefore taken by all agencies whenever 
there was evidence of good management. 
 
Agencies own assessment of their overall performance 
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The majority of respondents stated that their current approach to low-risk sites was 
structured by established standards and criteria, and that their methods were periodically 
checked for effectiveness. Overall, the respondents rated their agencies as performing 
well regarding effectiveness of resource use, justification to the public, targeting, 
consistency, ease of implementation and overall ‘good practice’. There were, however, 
indications that they felt that performance in some areas was stronger than others, though 
exactly which areas differed across the agencies. 
 
Summary 
 Overall, the survey revealed the relevance, in shaping agency strategies, of: the 
compliance history and cooperation of the operator; the nature of the risk or level of the 
risk rating; the organization and resourcing of the operator; and its  capacity to comply. 
The responses indicated, moreover, that the legislative context, and the organization, 
systems, processes and interpretive approach of the agency itself had an impact on how 
regulation was performed.    
The broad assessment given by officials was that field-level regulators were 
reasonably happy with the way that their agencies were regulating low-risk sites and 
activities. The detailed comments, though, revealed a more complex picture, with many 
suggesting that there were areas which could be improved, as discussed above. As for the 
possible deployment of unused but potential strategies for regulating low risks, a strong 
majority of respondents suggested that such opportunities were not being missed.   
Such survey responses, however, focus on the levels of satisfaction of involved 
parties rather than provide an independent view of strategies and operations. High levels 
of satisfaction may indicate either those current approaches are successful or that those 
responding are failing to think critically or laterally about the ways in which their 
agencies deal with low risks. It is striking, moreover, that those further up the 
organization, in more strategic policy positions, evidenced lower levels of satisfaction 
than those at field officer level – regarding  both  the agency’s current performance and  
the need for change.
10 
Whether it is possible to devise a general approach to low risks that 




2. Intervention strategies for low risks – a broader perspective 
 
The empirical research gave some broad indications of the types of approaches used with 
respect to low-risk sites or activities and of some of their strengths and weaknesses.  
More specific strategies for regulating low risk sites were gleaned both from a review of 
the primary and secondary literature of risk based regulatory strategies in five different 
domains (environment, fisheries, food safety, financial services and occupational health 
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and safety) in a number of countries (US, UK, the Netherlands, Canada, Australia, New 
Zealand and Sweden) and from the qualitative interviews with agency officials which 
supplemented the survey.
11
 This research revealed that a wide range of tools is used to 
regulate low-risk sites, many of which will be familiar to regulators and used for 
regulating higher risk activities, but whose effectiveness is often contingent on specific 
sets of factors. These strategies can be divided into three main groups, which broadly 
align with the order in which regulatory tasks are performed (we have excluded formal 
enforcement strategies as the aim of the project was to devise regulatory strategies to use 
other than formal enforcement action, though some of these overlap with informal modes 
of gaining compliance, notably advice and assistance). These are screening and rule-
based strategies, monitoring strategies and engagement and incentive strategies. 
 
Screening and rule-based strategies 
Regulatory regimes start from one of two default positions: an activity is allowed, but if 
carried out, becomes subject to regulation (as seen, for example, in much occupational 
health and safety regulation) or an activity is not allowed unless specifically authorized or 
exempt (for example, much financial services business, and much environment 
regulation). Screening and rule-based strategies are used initially to determine which 
default position is being adopted, who should fall within the regulatory regime and where 
their regulatory obligations are expressed. Broadly, there are four main strategies: 
exemptions without notification or registration; exemptions with notification or 
registration; application of general binding rules without notification/registration; and 
general binding rules, or standardized / bespoke permit and licensing systems with 
notification / registration.  Clearly, complete exemptions are the least intensive, although 
some monitoring may still be necessary to ‘police the boundaries’ and ensure there are no 
illegal operators.   Notification or registration has the advantage of enabling the regulator 
to identify and locate its regulated population, though requires both the agency and 
operators to keep records up to date if they are really to serve this function effectively.  
As for the instrument that contains the regulatory requirements to which the operator is 
subject, generally applicable binding rules are arguably a better instrument than licences 
for low risk activities, as tailored licences should not be necessary, and changes to 
provisions are easier to communicate via rules than changes to licence conditions. 
Unfortunately for regulators, the choice of strategy is usually made by the 
legislator, leaving regulators to administer systems which can be out of kilter with their 
risk assessments.  For lower risk activities, bespoke permitting or licensing systems are 
rare, and arguably not a good use of resources. Often, however, even very low risk 
activities have to have some form of licence or permit. Thus even though it may be more 
appropriate on a risk-basis to exempt a range of sites or activities completely, the 
regulator is stuck with a system which requires everyone to get a license which has to be 
renewed annually. However, the legislative framework can provide more flexibility in 
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some instances. There are examples of control of lower-risk activities by General Binding 
Rules (in Scottish water pollution) and General Mandatory Standards (in the Dutch 
environmental sector) (SEPA 2008). This involves the supervision of low risk activities 
by means of general rules that are applicable in the absence of any obligation to notify the 
regulator that an activity is being undertaken, quite common in health and safety but 
relatively rare in the rest of UK environmental regulation (IMPEL 2009, p. 12).  
 
Monitoring tools 
The second group of strategies comprises mechanisms that are used to gain information 
about a firm or sector’s compliance and to verify that information.  These can be 
categorized into four main types: those which involve direct contact between the 
regulator and regulatee; those which use proxy indicators; those which rely on the firm; 
and those using third party monitors.   
Those which involve direct contact between regulator and regulatee are the most 
common.  These include inspections and regulatory audits which may be performed on a 
routine, themed or random basis; advice and guidance visits and reactive investigations: 
responding to complaints, whistleblowing or post-incident investigations. 
One frequently used strategy for dealing with low-risk sites in the environmental, 
food and other sectors in the UK and globally is to relate the frequency of inspections to 
the level of risk that the regulated activity presents.
12
 Thus the low-risk site might be 
inspected every two years instead of six monthly for higher risk operations. A related 
approach is to limit the spread, rather than the frequency, of inspections by using 
sampling approaches in which certain sites are visited and those visits are used as 
indicators of more general practices and performance. In each case, all inspections cover 
the entirety of the firm’s activities (EPA 2007; Minnow Environmental Inc. 2005; Food 
Standards Agency 2010; Food Safety Authority of Ireland 2006; NAO 2008c). 
In many sectors, themed and special inspections have also been increasingly 
employed. Regulators identify particular themes or issues that they want to focus on, and 
inspect firm’s activities in those areas alone. Which firms are to be inspected within the 
theme may be based on a prior risk assessment or may be decided randomly (Black 
2008). In some jurisdictions, risks are prioritized within annual compliance and 
enforcement programs (AFMA 2010). The extent to which an agency can adopt a wide 
range of monitoring and intervention strategies may, however, be significantly hindered 
by legislation, often emanating from the EU. In the food sector, for example, themed 
inspections have only recently been included as one of the ‘official controls’ that the EU 
will recognize as constituting inspection and enforcement activity.  
One challenge with themed inspections is to balance attention to thematic risks 
with attention to firm-specific risks. The Health and Safety Executive (HSE) moved to a 
topic based approach to inspections from 2002, as part of its ‘revitalizing health and 
safety’ approach and then its Fit 3 program (HSE 2011). A National Audit Office (NAO) 
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report, produced late in the transition, found that questions arose within the HSE as to the 
actions that inspectors should take in response to risks that they saw during an inspection 
but which were not part of the ‘topic pack’ that they were using to assess the generic 
risks. As a result, there was an under-utilization of firm specific information and, 




A second challenge in systems that operate to themes or periodic programs is 
establishing the efficient frequency and scope of these themes and programs. If, for 
example, annual reviews are used, as in Australian fisheries, this may demand the 
expenditure of excessive resources in analyzing and assessing activities whose risks are 
static but it may prove too unresponsive to volatile risks. In some sectors there may be a 
case for targeted reviews rather than periodic reappraisals. Other regulators, such as the 
Financial Services Authority, use statistical analysis to identify firms that should be 
prioritized for themed inspections, based on risk indicators (FSA 2006). 
Random inspections are also used in monitoring low risk sites. Random 
inspections differ from thematic or sampling strategies in so far as minimal resources are 
devoted in the former to the selection of sites for inspection. Random inspections, 
nevertheless, can be an effective way to detect some non-compliance and they can be said 
to involve no unfairness to those targeted (merely bad luck) (EPA 2010; FSA 2006). A 
publicity strategy can, moreover, make random inspections an effective deterrent.  
Some regulators, e.g. the Scottish Environmental Protection Agency (SEPA), 
have moved away from inspections to audit based strategies. In an audit, the regulator 
reviews the systems and processes in place at a site for controlling the risks of an activity, 
rather than looking ‘on the spot’ at what activities are occurring.   
Inspections and audits, whether they are routine, themed, random or triggered by 
complaints, all involve ‘footfall’ by the regulator, a visit of some kind to the site or 
premises itself. In an attempt to rationalize this relatively expensive use of agency 
resources, other agencies have either replaced or supplemented such direct agency 
monitoring of a firm or site’s activities by using proxy strategies, relying to a greater 
extent on management-based strategies including self-certification, and by using third 
party monitors. Proxy strategies can include water sampling, for example sampling a 
downstream watercourse to measure water quality and use this as an indicator of 
discharges; or scrutinize fish market sales as an indicator of compliance with fishing at 
sea regulations.  
A further type of monitoring strategy involves controls that are management-
based – versions of which are known in the literature as ‘enforced self-regulation’ or 
‘meta-regulation’ (Coglianese & Mendelson 2010; Coglianese & Lazer 2003). The firm 
is required to put in place systems for managing its risks or complying with regulatory 
requirements. These systems are then approved by the regulator.  The processes of 
auditing or ‘meta-regulation’ allow the regulator to oversee the regulatee’s work in 
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controlling a risk rather than to monitor compliance directly. This makes for a low cost 
regime in so far as the regulator can examine the regulatees’ risk management systems 
(either on paper or in the field) rather than rely on inspections on the ground. This 
approach has been used in UK Health and Safety regulation since the 1970s. In the 
Netherlands, this mechanism, as used in the chemicals and other sectors, is referred to as 
‘self-management supervision’ (IMPEL 2009, p. 20). In the same country, the ‘audit by 
topic’ strategy is another process that assesses the quality of the management’s general 
approach to risks rather than attempts to check the individual details of compliance with 
permit conditions (IMPEL 2009, p. 21). 
Self-assessments are also being increasingly used with respect to low risk sites. 
For example, the Food Standards Agency has recently introduced self-assessments for 
low risk establishments. Self-certification is also an important aspect of the 
environmental regulation of certain low risk sites in the US as part of the Environmental 
Results Program (ERP). The ERP program is supplemented by targeted and random 
inspections. This combination has been shown to have a positive effect on compliance in 
a number of US states against a range of performance criteria (EPA 2010; FSA 2006). 
A final monitoring strategy involves the use of third party agents. In some 
regulatory regimes, for example environmental regulation in Portugal, the task of 
certifying compliance is given to commercial organizations (Black 2010). In England and 
Wales, the Environment Agency (EA) has recently adopted the Farm Assurance Scheme, 
in which it uses existing farm assurance companies (who are assessing farms for large 
retailers such as Tesco) to inspect pig and poultry farms against a set of criteria (EA 
2010). It then uses that data to decide whether or not to take enforcement action. The EA 
has gone from inspecting such farms twice a year to inspecting them once every three 
years. The assurance company inspects the farm annually, sending the information to the 
EA. The EA analyses the information to see if action needs to be taken and evaluates 
whether or not the farm still meets the criteria for being assessed as low risk. In assessing 
whether a farm should be in the scheme at all, the EA assesses it against a set of risk-
based criteria. These criteria do not include the size of the farm, on the basis that although 
a large farm may pose a higher inherent risk its net risk may be low due to strong 
management. The scheme has only been in place since the start of 2010, but interviews 
with EA officials indicated that it is working well. Regulators who act concurrently in 
relation to a given area of activity can reduce their costs and the costs imposed on 
businesses by avoiding duplications of effort. In Scotland, for example, the 
Environmental and Rural Services initiative brought together the regulatory activities of 
nine bodied working with rural land managers. This included co-ordination of inspection 
activity and included the staff of one authority undertaking inspections for others (IMPEL 
2009, p. 19). The Food Standards Agency also engages in joint inspections and data 
sharing with other regulators (NAO 2008a, p.6). Such an approach can be seen as a proxy 
system from the perspective of those agencies who enjoy the benefits of other agencies’ 
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inspections.  They have been applied in the Czech Republic, Greece, The Netherlands, 
Sweden and Turkey as well as the UK (IMPEL 2009, pp. 19-20). 
The legislative framework can inhibit the adoption of some of these strategies, 
however, so agencies have to be careful how they construct such regimes. In the EU, for 
example, competent authorities are not allowed to delegate their powers. The use of third 
parties therefore has to be constrained to certain activities. There may also be legal 
obstacles to information sharing, such as confidentiality and data protection obligations 
which may stand in the way of certain disclosures. In certain cases, legislation may 
therefore be required to permit regulatory agencies to share information about a regulated 
firm.   
 
Engagement and incentive strategies 
The third group of strategies consists of a broader set of ‘engagement’ and incentive 
intervention tools. These involve engagement with interested groups such as industry 
associations, NGOs, local communities and with other regulators to perform a range of 
functions, including giving information about how improve regulatory performance, 
designing products and processes that can be more effective at achieving regulatory 
objectives, and engaging with other agencies in performing a range of activities, 
including linking regimes so that, for example, one agency can provide or withhold a 
subsidy from a firm depending on its compliance with the requirements imposed by 
another regulator. 
In some cases, the best way to mitigate low levels of risk is not through the 
agency pursuing greater levels of compliance as such, but through encouraging 
stakeholder or industry-led solutions. Focusing on the design of equipment and 
technology has long been a central part of environmental regulation. It can be an effective 
way of demonstrating clear engagement with stakeholders, limiting risks and of targeting 
specific risks or particular localities. In particular, it can be a cost effective way of 
dealing with low risk sites, at least for the agency, and can have pay-offs for industry. A 
dynamic advantage may sometimes be gleaned in so far as industry is often best placed to 
identify and (with encouragement) to address new risks.  
There are examples of agencies developing stakeholder-led solutions of this type. 
One example, in the agricultural sector, is the EA’s practice of working with the Odour 
Group, an industry group, to encourage them to develop technologies to reduce odors 
from poultry and piggery farms. With respect to small household wastewater discharges, 
the EA liaises with manufacturers on designs and operating systems for lavatories. As for 
potential weaknesses of such strategies, one is that the regulator may be open to criticism 
if engagement is seen to stand in the way of proper enforcement action. A second 
difficulty may be that industry may take some time to develop and adopt appropriate 
designs. This is an approach that works best where there is a clearly identifiable group of 
affected stakeholders and where contention is low or can be resolved. 
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Information and education strategies can also play an important role with respect 
to low risk sites (e.g. EPA 2010, p. 11).
 
One of the functions of inspections or visits is to 
inform regulatees of their obligations and to advise them on how to comply. For low risk 
sites, this is a very costly activity in proportion to the risks posed. However, if inspections 
cease or are severely reduced for these firms, this source of information obviously 
disappears. One approach is to use NGOs to advise and assist firms to develop an 
understanding of their regulatory requirements and to help build the technical capacity to 
develop adequate management systems. For example, in Northern Ireland, the NIEA 
worked with an NGO to help SMEs develop EMS accredited management systems.   
Campaign information and guidance can be published ‘bare’ on websites or, as is 
common, can be disseminated through workshops (EPA 2008, p. 11). In relation to lower 
risk operators this advantage may be significant. A report by the NAO found that 
campaigning activity ‘plays a key role in risk-based systems of regulation in reaching 
low-risk businesses that might not otherwise come into contact with the regulators’ (NAO 
2008a). In Australia it has been argued that, although proactive strategies such as 
education can be more resource intensive than reactive alternatives such as post-accident 
investigations, they can still be more cost-effective. Broad education campaigns, the 
argument runs, can deliver higher compliance levels than under-resourced inspection 
regimes (Productivity Commission Australia 2009, p. 133). The HSE is at the forefront of 
this approach in the UK. The HSE faces significant resource constraints, and cannot 
inspect the bulk of its regulated population on a regular basis. A firm will on average be 
inspected once every 14.5 years (HCSCWP 2007). In addressing this problem, the HSE 
has shifted from an approach based mainly on risk, which produces a huge number of 
firms with similar risk profiles, to one based on achievability: what is the most effective 
type of intervention that it can effect with respect to different types of firms, other than an 
inspection. It has been working on a system of ‘segmenting’ its regulated population, in 
much the same way as advertisers segment their target audiences. It has been developing 




Finally, incentive strategies can be used to great effect. In Northern Ireland, for 
example, until recently those complying with the waste requirements received a rebate on 
their landfill tax payments, which significantly increased rates of compliance in the 
sector. In Scotland, farmers will not receive their single farm payments if they are in 
breach of their obligations under the Water Framework Directive (Scottish Government, 
Single Farm Payment Scheme Information Leaflet).  
Such schemes require significant inter-agency cooperation, but are clearly not 
impossible. However, again other aspects of the overall regulatory framework can cut 
across this approach. Regulators can be dissuaded from strategies of education and advice 
by the evaluation criteria used to audit their activities. In the food sector, EU regulations 
stipulate what is an accepted ‘official control’ for the purposes of auditing food 
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inspection authorities. Until recently these did not include offering education and advice 
(EC 882/2004).
15
 In the environmental sector in the UK, including Northern Ireland and 
Scotland, the system of linking charging regimes with inspections means that any 
reduction in inspection activity reduces the amount of resources that the agency has. 
Charging structures can thus tie agencies to traditional approaches (i.e. routine 
inspections) cutting across their ability to develop alternative strategies.  Charging 
schemes can also incentivise regulators to keep firms or activities in higher risk 
categories, for which higher fees can be charged.   Low risk regulation still requires some 
resources, but it is difficult to fund them on a cost-recovery basis. 
 
Summary 
In practice there is a wide range of intervention tools which can and are being used with 
respect to low risks.  The range and variety of these tools is at odds with the prescriptions 
of a number of other risk governance frameworks, which suggest that low risks can be 
handled through simple routine monitoring (eg IRGC 2005; WBGU 2000).  The 
intervention tools that have the major potential for use with low-risk sites can be 
summarised as in Table 2. 
 
Table 2: Potential tools for Low-Risk Sites/Activities 
Screening and rule-based strategies 
1. Exemptions without notification or registration 
2. Exemptions with notification or registration 
3. Registration plus conditions/rules; permit and licensing systems 
4. Application of general binding rules without notification/registration 
Monitoring tools 
5. Frequency adjusted inspections or monitoring 
6. Regulatory audits 
7. Themed inspections or monitoring  
8. Random inspections or monitoring  
9. Advice and assistance visits 
10. Reactive investigations, responding to complaints, whistleblowing or post-
incident investigations 
11. Surveillance 
12. Benchmarking or ‘yardsticking’ strategies 
13. Measuring indirect/proxy outcomes 
14. Self monitoring and self certification by regulated firms 
15. Management based strategies including mandatory performance disclosure by 
regulated firms   
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16. Third-party monitoring  
17. Information and inspection sharing regimes 
Engagement and incentive strategies  
 
18. Information campaigns; generic advice and recommendations (including codes 
and guidance) 
19. Dialogue with interested parties  
20. Industry or NGO / interested party-led solutions 
21. Multi-agency approaches 
22. Incentive strategies 
 
The above strategies can be used in combination: they are not necessarily alternatives.  
For example, even within a statutory permitting regime, it is still possible to use 
engagement strategies, such as information campaigns, to inform regulatees of their 
obligations and give advice on how to comply.  Third party monitoring can be combined 
with some random inspections / audits by the agency itself, to check both the regulatee 
and the third party auditor.  Proxy monitoring, such as water sampling, can be combined 
with themed inspections, for examples of particular farming practices.   
Each of the specific strategies within each group has different strengths and 
weaknesses, and each may differ in the extent to which it meets different criteria.  The 
criteria  used to assess each strategy in this project were a variant of the UK 
government’s PACTT principles, notably (proportionality, accountability, consistency, 
transparency and targetting (Hampton 2005), with the added criterion of adaptability 
(ability to identify and respond to change in risk profiles). In many cases, the extent to 
which a strategy does or does not meet the criteria in practice will depend on the details 
of its design and implementation in specific circumstances. For example, third party 
monitoring requires close supervision of the third party monitors, may or may not be 
done transparently, and may or may not be able to respond to change, all depending on 
how the scheme is designed and implemented.   
Further, none of these strategies is specific to low risk sites. Under a risk-based 
framework, their use in relation to lower, as opposed to higher, risk sites should be 
decided with reference to the amount of regulatory resourcing that is needed for their 
application and the particular nature of the risk and risk creator. It follows that certain 
strategies are more appropriate for certain lower risk sites and regulatees than others. 
Where risks are inherently low and static, there is normally less need for bespoke 
licenses, for extensive audits, or for management based controls. Tailored licensing or 
rules, audits and management based intervention strategies, for example, may however be 
appropriate where the risk is dynamic and a net low risk, in other words, the level of risk 
is contingent on the strength of management and other controls to reduce the inherent risk 






There are, as discussed,  a number of specific issues that arise with respect to selecting 
and managing low risks, and regulators have developed a number of different strategies 
to address them.  Providing a review of strategies only takes us so far, however.  The 
pressing question  is which of the available strategies are the ones to use to control  a 
given risk use.  There are a number of different ways of devising a framework for guiding 
such choices of intervention methods, and it is to this task that we turn in Part II of this 
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 Respectively: the Environment Agency (EA), Northern Ireland Environment 
Agency (NIEA), Scottish Environmental Protection Agency (SEPA) and the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) of the Republic of Ireland.  The research project 
consisted of three main stages: first, a desk-based review of the approaches adopted by 
regulators in the areas of environment, fisheries, food, financial services and occupational 
health and safety in the US, UK, Netherlands, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, and 
Sweden, together with a web-based survey of field officers (detailed at n.2) and semi-
structured interviews with two policy officials at each agency responsible for different 
low risks (April-September 2010).  Second, the framework was developed and then 
reviewed and revised in an iterative process which involved a series of meetings run to a 
common agenda with inspectors, programme or regional managers, representatives of the 
regulated sector, representatives of any relevant NGOs and a representative from the 
relevant government department where possible at each of the four agencies.  Theselected 
areas were low-risk agricultural discharges, peat harvesting, low-risk industrial 
discharges, septic tanks and other domestic waste, and waste transfer stations. (February-
March 2011) (a total of 14 interviewees), followed by a further series of meetings with a 
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wider range of senior policy officials within the agencies (May 2011) (a total of 38 
officials across the 4 agencies).  The final Framework was then tested in intensive case-
study based workshops with the EA and SEPA in October 2011.   Full details of the 




 The findings of this part of the research are based on a desk-based review of 
practices of regulators in five domains in six countries (conducted from May-September 
2010), on a web-based survey of 102 field-level officers in the four agencies (conducted 
from July-September 2010); and semi-structured interviews with program managers and 
directors in each of the four agencies, representatives from regulated firms, the relevant 
government departments and NGOs (conducted between July 2010-May 2011). 
 
3
 It should be noted that it is often the nature of the impact (which may turn on the 
sensitivity of an impact site) and not just its quantum that is relevant - see e.g. the 
Environment Agency’s OPRA framework outlined at EA Operational Risk Appraisal. 
 
4
 Extensive work on perceptions of risk indicates that that the assessment of either 
element is rarely as objective as risk models and risk management processes may assume 
(Royal Society 1992; Slovic 2000; Renn 1992). 
 
5
 As noted, a general activity (such as a commonly adopted practice in a sector) 




 Regulators can be hampered by legislative frameworks that operate on a pollutant 
by pollutant basis and lead agencies to focus on specific activities that occur on different 
sites rather than to develop a site-based approach (which would often make more sense 




 The survey covered the areas of: Agriculture (poultry and piggeries); Chemicals; 
Power stations; Waste (e.g. civic amenity sites, landfill sites (small non-hazardous), 
transfer stations (dry recyclables)); Scrap metal including ELV, shredder sites and metal 
recycling; Low effluent wastewater sewage treatment activities; and Industrial point 
source discharges to watercourses. 
 
8
 The survey was conducted between July and September 2010 using software 
provided by SurveyMonkey. Of the 111 respondents, 64 were from the EA, 6 from the 
EPA, 20 from NIEA and 21 from SEPA. The responses were analyzed by regulatory 
agency as well as by overall response, as the analysis would otherwise be skewed by the 
EA response. Most of the respondents identified the sites they surveyed as ‘net low-risk’ 
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rather than ‘intrinsic low-risk’ and most believed their sites were of ‘medium’ or ‘high’ 
social/political importance. Full details are set out in SNIFFER 2010b. 
 
9
 The large majority of field officers responded that they did not distinguish 
between low- and high-risk sites in their enforcement strategy. However, enforcement at 
low risk sites was frequently reactive, following a complaint. 
 
10
 A number of commentators have drawn attention to the ‘multiple selves’ of 
regulated organizations and the gulf between management and field-level operators 




 Semi-structured interviews were conducted with senior officials in each of the 
sectors that were the subject of the survey in each of the agencies. The project also 
involved a desk-based review of the approaches adopted by regulators in the areas of 
environment, fisheries, food, financial services and occupational health and safety in the 
US, UK, Netherlands, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, and Sweden. The full 
findings are available at SNIFFER 2011. 
 
12
 This option was suggested in the IMPEL 2008, p.43. See also Black 2008. 
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 The HSE has sought to reach agricultural workers by attending agricultural 
shows, farmers markets, and by targeting information at farmers’ wives. It even used the 
BBC Radio 4 program, The Archers, to publicize the dangers of tractors through a 
storyline about a tractor fatality. It has, similarly targeted construction workers with radio 
and TV campaigns, celebrity endorsements, and shock campaigns. In a further initiative, 
it has co-operated with hire shops and builders merchants who have run equipment 
replacement schemes for builders. 
 
15
 Recent changes to EU requirements have, however, enabled the Food Standards 
Agency, to adopt such approaches and following research which showed the 
effectiveness of such strategies, the FSA has relaxed its own criteria for auditing local 
authorities to include education and advice in the intervention strategies that it will 
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When Risk-Based Regulation Aims Low: Part II - A Strategic Framework 
 
Abstract 
This part of the article builds on the analysis of the first part (published in the 
previous issue) and it develops a strategic framework for regulators to employ when choosing 
intervention strategies. The framework offered derives from a research project conducted for, 
and in conjunction with, the four environment regulators of England and Wales, Northern 
Ireland, Scotland and the Republic of Ireland.  The elements of the framework are presented 
and the discussion considers whether, and how, such a framework could be used by 
regulatory agencies in a manner that is operable, dynamic, transparent and justifiable. It is 
argued that coming to grips with the challenges presented by low risks compels us to rethink 




The first part of this article (Black and Baldwin 2011) examined the particular issues 
that arise with respect to selecting and managing low risks, and it considered how regulators 
tend to deal with lower risks in practice.
 
Providing a review of strategies only takes us so far, 
however.  The key issue is how to select the strategies to use in any given context.  In this 
respect, other risk governance frameworks tend to gloss over the difficulties involved in 
making a selection, and where the matter is addressed in any detail, they are inclined to 
restrict the range of strategies to routine monitoring. Much of their attention, is focussed, 
instead, on methods of risk assessment and on engagement with the wider community (eg 
IRGC 2005; WBGU 2000; Cabinet Office 2002; Codex Alimentarius 2003; FERMA 2003).  
There are, however, a number of possible ways to devise a framework for intervention 
strategies.  
A simple approach would be to select one strategy of the many that are possible and 
apply this to all lower risk sites or activities. A modified version of the US Environmental 
Protection Agency’s Environmental Results Programme could be used, for example, to 
require all those operating low-risk sites or activities to adopt a program or self-certification 
supplemented by periodic inspections (EPA 2010). Requiring regulators to adopt only a 
single strategy, however, may be unnecessarily constraining, and, in some instances, may 
lead to ineffectiveness (Simon 2010).  
An alternative option would be to focus on the nature of the risk alone and to select 
intervention strategies with reference to the amount of regulatory resources that each 
involves.  We have argued that low risks can take a number of forms: they may be inherent 
or net, static or dynamic, systemic or non-systemic. So even within the low-risk category, 
some low risks are lower than others. Based on this breakdown, an intervention ‘pyramid’ 
could be constructed with the least intensive regulatory strategies at the base used for 
inherent and stable low risks, and the more intensive used for net, dynamic low risks. For 
example, for inherent low risks which are stable, general binding rules, shared monitoring 
with other agencies where possible or by third party auditors over a relatively long cycle, for 
example once every five years, and / or using NGOs or others to develop and deliver 
education and advice programs).  For net, dynamic low-risks more intensive strategies 
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would be appropriate, such as bespoke licensing, self-certification verified by third party 
auditors with full regulatory audit supplementing periodically, but with a shorter monitoring 
cycle, for example once every three years.   
Such an approach would be consistent with the main thrust of most risk-based 
assessment frameworks which direct resources to the highest risks.  Using the nature of the 
risk to drive the intervention strategy, however, focuses on just one aspect of the task in 
hand and is largely divorced from the enforcement approach that most regulators take (and 
the literature urges them to take), which is to tailor their response to the attitude of the 
regulatee and their capacity to comply (Ayres & Braithwaite 1992; Braithwaite 2001; 
Baldwin 1990; Barrett & Fudge 1981; Neilsen & Parker 2009).  It could be argued that a 
‘pyramid’ approach, which adjusted the intervention strategy simply to the firm’s risk score, 
would capture both elements since compliance history forms part of that score. Most risk 
scoring systems, however, do not capture the reasons why regulatees fail to comply, despite 
research showing the need for regulators to take  account the reasons for non-compliance as 
well as the fact of non-compliance.    
The extensive literature on literature on regulatory enforcement and its counterpart 
literature on business responses to regulation suggest that both compliance-orientated and 
enforcement activities (including for these purposes advice and assist visits, or education 
campaigns as well as formal enforcement action) should vary with the behaviour and 
compliance motivations of the regulatee (eg Kagan & Scholz 1984; Kagan 1994; Scholz 
1991; Ayres & Braithwaite 1992; Gunningham & Sinclair 2009; Parker and Neilsen 2011).  
In practice, as the research for this project and the literature on inspections and compliance 
shows, regulators do adjust their strategies on a firm by firm basis, often with reference to 
the compliance history of the particular firm or site operator. Indeed, some regulators have 
gone a step further and grouped their regulated population according to their propensity to 
comply. For example, Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC) characterizes those 
who pay VAT on the basis of their predicted response to tax laws.
1
 As noted above, a 
similar approach is used by the Australian Tax Office, which uses categorizations of 
people’s propensity to pay tax as the basis for structuring its interactions with them, an 
approach also adopted by the Australian Fisheries Management Authority 
Such targeting can enable the type of intervention to be tailored most appropriately to 
the type of regulatee (e.g. advice for those who are well-intentioned but ill-informed; strong 
enforcement action against those who are ill-intentioned).
2
 It is a focus, however, that does 
not deal with the nature of risks as such, other than risks of non-compliance. Not all instances 
of non-compliance pose the same level of environmental risks.  
A disconnect thus exists between the risk-based categorization of sites and activities, 
which drives permitting and is meant to drive resource allocation, and the predominantly 
behaviour-based approach of the enforcement manuals, and indeed of the preponderance of 
the literature on compliance and enforcement.  
Furthermore, there is a strategic gap between the risk-based assessment process and 
the enforcement process, with very little sense of an approach to using, not simply 
inspections, but a broader range of screening, monitoring, engagement and incentive 
strategies – all of which fall short of formal enforcement action. 
3 
 
Can a general strategic framework be developed for dealing with low-risk 
sites/activities which can bridge these two gaps? In this and the following section, we 
develop a framework for strategic decision making that integrates risk and behavior, and 
which is based on a ‘really responsive’ approach to regulation (Baldwin & Black 2008; 
Black & Baldwin 2010, p. 181-213).   
The ‘really responsive’ approach suggests that there are five sets of factors which 
should, and often do, influence how regulators behave and the effectiveness of regulation. 
Thus, once regulators are clear about their regulatory objectives, they should devise their 
strategies with an eye not merely to the kind of low risk at issue and the suitability of different 
tools for intervention, but to the relevant characteristics of the regulated concerns that are 
involved. These characteristics should include, notably, their cultures - the attitudes, 
motivational postures and cognitive frameworks of regulated firms that influence regulatory 
relationships and the regulator’s capacity to influence behavior. Other factors to be 
considered are the organizational settings  - the institutional locations of the regulator that 
have a critical effect regulation. This includes not only the regulators’ resource positions but 
the systems of accountability and political sensitivities that (actually or potentially) impact on 
low-risk regulation. A further matter to take on board is performance assessment and the need 
for processes that allow the regulator to judge whether their efforts (and budgets) are having 
any positive effect in furthering their objectives and whether there is a need to adjust 
approaches. Finally, as noted, it is necessary to establish systems that are marked by 
sensitivity to changes in risks as these may flow from new operations, processes and 
technologies and which need to be responded if confidence in the regulator is to be sustained. 
We expand on each of these in turn in the context of regulating low risks. 
 
Key elements of a ‘really responsive’ framework 
  
The suitability of different tools  
In choosing different strategies and tools for use with respect to lower risks, attention should 
be paid to two central issues: the potential of particular intervention mechanisms and the 
ways in which different tools will interact. On the first matter, it has been seen above that 
some strategies relate to the discharge of detection and monitoring functions and others are 
concerned with impacting on the behavior of regulatees more directly through enforcement 
and related actions. The different tools, as seen, have divergent strengths and weaknesses 
when judged according to the factors considered above (targeting, costs and efficiency; 
transparency, justification and representative values; and dynamic efficiency) and it is 
necessary to link these different capacities to the particular risk and regulatory sector. 
In general terms, regulators should develop mixes of strategies that are suitable for 
discharging the main tasks of regulation (notably of detection, enforcement, performance 
assessment and strategic adjustment) (Baldwin & Black 2008). In particular, in relation to 
low risks, they should also be aware of the potential of the variety of non-routine inspection 
strategies discussed in Part 3 and should weigh up their respective strengths and weaknesses. 
Regulators should also strive to minimize the costs of their detection work and, to this end, 
they should consider using the different proxy strategies reviewed above. They should, in 
addition, consider using generic (across the board) responses (e.g. screening and rule-based 
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strategies or engagement strategies) where this would be more cost-effective than enforcing 
against particular sites. They should, moreover, be able to identify common (or ‘cumulative’) 
risks that are best regulated generically and, if they are applying a general strategy across 
risks, they should be aware of the special challenges that are presented by low-risk sites. 
Finally, they should consider how intensively to apply their chosen tools.
3
  
As for interactions of regulatory tools, challenges arise because different such tools 
often have divergent logics – they embody different regulator to regulatee relationships and 
they assume different ways of interacting. It is, accordingly, essential for a low-risk regulator 
to consider how numbers of tools are mixed, when there will be compatibilities of tool use 
and when there will be tensions or underminings (For similar reviews of compatibilities in 
intervention methods see Gunningham & Grabosky 1998; Gunningham 2007). Of the tools 
discussed above, for instance, it can be foreseen that exemptions without registration are 
difficult to use in combination with systems of self-monitoring and self-certification by 
regulated firms. Similarly, stakeholder dialogues cannot easily be combined with the use of 
third party surveillance and monitoring processes. In contrast, there may be no reason why 
whistle-blowing strategies cannot be combined with licensing and permitting systems or why 
themed inspections cannot be used alongside requirements of mandatory performance 
disclosure by firms. The search for the optimal mix of strategy will, moreover, have to be 
conducted with the particular type of low risk site or activity in mind. 
 
Cultures  
Many of the intervention tools described above will work best when applied to certain kinds 
of regulated concern. Some will tend to work especially badly when the regulatee’s attitude is 
inappropriate. Thus, the use of General Binding Rules to non-notifiable activities is liable to 
produce problems with organizations that are ill informed about their legal requirements and 
ill disposed to secure information on their obligations. Reduced frequency inspections will 
tend to be problematic when regulatees are ill disposed to voluntary compliance and liable to 
game the system. Themed, or ad hoc, investigations may, however, have considerable 
potential where there are particularly difficult regulatees who are engaged in an activity. 
Visits to assist with compliance will work reasonably effectively with well-intentioned 
regulatees (as will rules requiring performance disclosures by firms) but may prove to be a 
waste of resource with ‘amoral calculators’ who will not be inclined towards voluntary 
compliance (Kagan & Scholz 1984). In some areas of industry (as where risks are numerous 
and complex) it may be more necessary than in others to consider regulatees’ cultures and, in 
such instances, behaviour-targetted inspections will prove especially useful.  
 
Organizational settings 
In using its regulatory toolkit to control low risks, it is important for the regulator to be aware 
of the risk tolerance that it embraces and of the political risks that it is running. The regulator 
should consider such matters as the probability that a given tool will not detect or influence 
certain conduct and how it can cope with criticism when a harm occurs or its inactions are 
exposed. Matters to be taken in here include special ministerial, media, parliamentary or 
public sensitivities concerning particular risks and any inter-institutional factors that should 
be taken on board. The special propensity of some tools to expose the regulator to such 
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institutional and political risks will accordingly be a matter to be adverted to in using these. 
The use of General Binding Rules without notification, for instance, means that there are high 
risks that some undesirable activities will escape attention and this may be particularly 
embarrassing for the regulator in some sectors or in relation to some activities. Another 
potentially difficult tool is the third party inspection system - which may present particular 
problems of accountability, for example. 
 Resourcing issues also have to be taken on board in looking at the regulator’s 
organizational position. The resource available for controlling low risks will generally be 
restricted by general budgetary constraints and by the regulator’s balancing of higher and 
lower risk priorities. These budgetary limitations should be considered in selecting 
intervention tools and strategies. Some mechanisms may be especially useful when resources 
are very thin (e.g. reactive, complaints-driven and whistle-blowing systems) others may only 




The testing of performance is, as noted, vital if approaches to low risks are to be evaluated, 
adjusted or justified. Different intervention approaches, however, vary in their conduciveness 
to such testing (as do different mixes of these). Themed inspections, for instance, tend to be 
useful for measuring both compliance levels and regulatory performance in a specified area 
but exemptions without registration can be expected to be far less conducive to testing and 
assessment. As for other indicators of performance, quite different challenges are posed by 
such devices as: mandatory disclosure requirements, third party monitoring systems, 
complaints-driven mechanisms and procedures for measuring indirect or proxy outcomes. 
Thus, measuring a proxy outcome, such as water quality, can, in some circumstances offer a 
very useful guide to the performance of the regulatory system whereas regimes of mandatory 
disclosure can constitute highly dubious assessment procedures where the regulated concerns 
are ill disposed to compliance or lack the capacity to comply.  Reactive / complaint-driven 
mechanisms are useful for visible effects of non-compliance (eg where the water has turned 
purple), but are largely useless for diffuse pollution, which by its nature is difficult to detect. 
  
Sensitivity to changes 
It is important that low-risk regulators can both detect shifts in challenges or risks and that 
they have the capacity and commitment to respond to such changes by adapting and 
developing their approaches to low-risk sites or activities. The various intervention strategies 
and tools that were discussed in Part 3 do, however, vary in the extent to which they can 
foster responsiveness. Some tend to be attuned to static risks (notably exemptions without 
registration and General Binding Rules covering non-notifiable activities) but others will 
provide much stronger responsiveness to changes (notably reactive investigations, random 
inspections, and measures of proxy outcomes). In circumstances where regulators are not 
fully confident that risks and political expectations are fixed, a best practice approach would 





 Regulating Low Risk Sites - A Proposed Framework 
 
Our argument is that, in developing and deploying strategies for dealing with low-risks, 
regulators should be responsive to these five key factors. We suggest, furthermore, that there 
are strong arguments, noted above, for basing a regulatory strategy not just on the nature of 
the risks of the activities, but on the attitude of the firm and the likelihood of compliance, 
either by particular operators or across a particular sector or activity as a whole.  How, 
though, is a regulator to determine which strategies to use in which circumstances, and what 
level of regulatory resources to apply in using them? A ‘best practice’ framework cannot 
neatly reconcile public expectations of universal protection with the regulatory reality of 
prioritization and rationing. It can, however, help regulators to identify those intervention 
tools that are likely to have the most potential in relation to different risks and contexts. 
Such a framework can also provide a rational and defensible basis for decisions and can be 
referred to when strategic choices are subjected to public and political challenge.  
The framework we propose has at its core a matrix which we call the GRID – the 
Good Regulatory Intervention Design. The aim of the GRID is to provide a framework for 
deciding systematically which strategies should be used for which types of risk and which 
type of regulatee. It operates on the basis that two key factors should guide decisions on the 
intervention tools to use.  
The first is the nature of the risk. If an activity is inherently low-risk and liable to 
remain so during the period between strategic reviews, it can be dealt with by means of a 
strategy that might not be appropriate in the case of a net low-risk (i.e. an inherently higher 
risk that is reduced by good management) – especially a net low-risk that is not stable – 
because there is evidence that management may change between strategic reviews. 
The second key factor is the nature of the regulatee. Some low-risk intervention 
strategies work well with well-motivated and high capacity
4
 firms (e.g. self-certification 
systems) but would not prove successful where firms are ill-motivated and have a low 
capacity to comply. Some low-risk intervention strategies work well with well-motivated 
firms who have a high capacity to comply (e.g. self-certification systems) but would not 
prove successful where firms are less motivated to comply, and have a low capacity to 
comply because of limitations in such matters as information about regulatory requirements, 
resources, systems and personnel (On capacity see Kagan & Scholz 1984; Baldwin 1990; 
Haines 2011a; Black 2003).  On compliance motivations see Braithwaite et al. 2007).  
Moreover, the attitude and capacity of the regulatee is particularly critical for determining 
whether a higher risk can be in fact classified as a lower ‘net’ risk and for the intervention 
strategy that should be used. 
The breakdown of regulatee types set out in Table 2 below involves a downward 
progression from those liable to demand low levels of intervention to those who need to be 
controlled by more robust methods.   It is worth noting that the order in which they lie in the 
GRID was the subject of considerable discussion during the project; the rationale for having 
those with low capacity and lower motivation at the bottom of the GRID, and thus as 
requiring the more intensive intervention, is that even if the regulator manages to ‘turn’ them 







Table 1: Characterizing Regulatees  
 
Type of Regulatee                                        Characteristics 
Well- motivated with high capacity to 
comply 
Regulatees are willing to comply (judged 
on their records and/or officers’ 
estimations) and are sufficiently well 
informed, resourced, and organized to 
allow compliance. 
Well- motivated with low capacity to 
comply 
Regulatees are willing to comply but are 
not sufficiently well informed, resourced, 
and organized to foster compliance. 
Less motivated with high capacity to 
comply 
Regulatees are less willing to comply but 
they are sufficiently well informed, 
resourced and organized to allow 
compliance if their motivation is 
improved. 
Less motivated with low capacity to 
comply 
Regulatees are less willing to comply and 
are not sufficiently well informed, 
resourced and organized to foster 




In combining types of risk and types of regulatee, the GRID offers a framework for 
identifying potentially useful regulatory tools. The horizontal axis involves a progression in 
types of low-risk activity – from inherent and stable low risks that require the least intensive 
interventions on the left, to net low risks that are unstable and which call for more urgent 
attention on the right. The vertical axis involves a similar ‘progression of intensity’ from 
those who are well motivated with a higher capacity to comply at the top to those who are 
less well motivated with a lower capacity to comply at the base.
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capacity to comply 
    Screening 
tools 
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tools 
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Low Low Low Low Regulatory 
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Regulatees are less 
motivated with high 
capacity to comply 
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intensity 
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    Screening 
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    Engagement 
& incentive 
mechanisms 









Medium Medium High High Regulatory 
intensity 
 
The right hand column of the GRID divides intervention tools into three types  (in the 
ordering used in Section 2 and Table 2 above) and it also suggests a level of regulatory 
intensity that might be appropriate in the case of a particular combination of risk and 
regulatee type. Suggested regulatory intensity refers to the amount of regulatory resources to 
be applied to a site or activity and to the severity with which any sanctions are applied. 
Intensity is expressed relatively and is rated ‘high’, ‘medium’ ‘medium-low’ or ‘low’.  
Accompanying the GRID (but not set out here) is an Intervention Guide: a list of the 
Table 2 tools or strategies and an indication of the time frame required for their development 
in order to aid planning. Each tool is assessed in the Guide against three criteria: its relative 
effectiveness in different situations and contexts; the manner and degree to which it could be 
rendered transparent and justifiable; and the degree to which it could be dynamic, or able to 
identify and / or respond to change. The Guide provides a short description of the 
intervention strategy, some of the risks of using it and how these might be addressed. It also 
indicates which other strategies any particular strategy is likely to be compatible with, and 
which it is not (see SNIFFER 2011).  
In some cases, notably for screening and rule-based strategies, the agency may not 
have any discretion as to the strategy that it is to adopt, as this is prescribed by legislation. In 
certain instances, however, the agency may be able to decide, for example, to exempt low 
risk sites completely without the need for registration. With respect to monitoring and proxy, 
and engagement and incentive strategies, however, the agency is likely to have greater ability 
to exercise a choice regarding the strategies that it will adopt. The Intervention Guide does 
not include formal enforcement tools, though some of the strategies included may also be 
used as informal enforcement tools, for example advice and assistance. It would, therefore, be 
important in implementing the Framework to ensure consistency between the agencies’ 
enforcement guides and the intervention strategies selected using the GRID, particularly 
where the same strategies are covered by both. 
         In order to use the GRID, however, regulators have to be able to characterize risk-types 
and regulatee-types accurately.  Here regulators face a trade-off between accuracy and 
resources: given that these risks are already categorised as being at the lower end of the 
regulators’ risk spectrum, the amount of resources spent in analysing which ‘box’ each site or 
activity should be put has to be less than would be the case if a similar framework was used 
for high risks.  For low risks, we suggest that agencies apply a sector-based approach, but 
they could give discretion to regional managers or field officers to deviate from the ‘default’ 
categorisation (subject to justification). Such managers or officers might also be given the 
tasks of setting ‘review periods’ - the frequencies with which they plan to conduct reviews of 
strategies for dealing with  risks and their categorisations in the particular targeted area. 
Agencies and relevant staff will then be positioned to think methodically about the 
intervention tools that they will use in the coming period and to ‘populate’ the GRID’s boxes 
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with the tools that are considered to have potential in relation to different combinations of 
risk and regulatee type.  
 An example can help to illustrate the process.   The regulation of septic tanks has 
proved a particularly difficult issue for a number of the regulators.  Septic tanks are used for 
small scale, on-site sewage treatment for domestic waste water for households not connected 
to the main sewer system.   Most consist principally of a collection tank and an underground 
disposal field or percolation area.   They are high in number (over 350,000 in each of 
England & Wales and over 300,000 Eire, for example), but most users are domestic 
households or small organisations such as hotels, residential care homes, or schools.  Many 
are sited in areas of natural beauty and near watercourses (eg in the English Lake District).  
Domestic wastewater contains many substances that are potentially harmful to human health 
and the environment and in recent years there has been an increase in the contamination of 
groundwater, lakes, rivers and streams as a result of lack of understanding of the treatment 
and disposal processes required for small scale domestic wastewater, which has led to poor 
design, siting and installation of septic tanks (EPA 2007).  At present, permits are required 
for those over a prescribed waste limit.    
How should regulators manage the risks that they pose?  Using the GRID, regulators 
would first characterise the regulatees and the risks on a sector basis.  In a workshop run as 
part of the research project this example was employed as a GRID case study and regulators 
concluded that most regulatees could be characterised has having low motivation (out of 
sight, out of mind) with low capacity to comply (small scale users with no relevant expertise).  
The risk could be characterised as a net low risk which may change or accumulate.  
Regulators then considered which strategy to use from each set of strategies.  (In this case, 
the screening / rule-based strategy was mandated by the legislature, but it was noted that 
using the GRID provided an opportunity for agency strategists to identify any strategic 
deficiencies and a basis for raising these with the relevant government / EU officials.)  Each 
of the monitoring strategies was considered in turn.  Some were quickly discarded: routine 
monitoring was too resource intensive: there are simply too many individual sites to be 
inspected on a regular basis.  Themed monitoring which focused on an activity or control 
system was not appropriate for a simple activity such as this, though it could be used on a 
geographical basis as a follow up to findings from proxy strategies such as water sampling.  
Some low frequency random monitoring could be done, but again it might be more fruitful to 
use proxy strategies such as water sampling first to decide where closer investigation is 
needed.  Self monitoring and certification could be adopted; this might help to raise 
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awareness and improve motivation.  Such a strategy could be combined with information 
campaigns, information sharing with local authorities (who give licences for abstraction of 
drinking water), and working with interested parties such as parish councils or other local 
community groups to raise awareness, and with industry to improve the design and 
installation of the septic tank systems.   
 
The GRID, as applied to the case study, might be summarized as below and would suggest 
that certain intervention tools merit special consideration by strategists. (The tools are 
numbered as in Table 2 above). Note that although the regulatory intensity is marked as 
‘high’, it should be remembered that this means ‘high relative to other low risks’. 
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 Net low-risk – but may change or accumulate  
Regulatees 
are  less 
motivated 
with low  
capacity to 
comply  
 Permitting regime now required by law  where 
prescribed waste limit exceeded 
Screening 
tools 
8. Low frequency random monitoring 
13. Proxy strategies (water sampling) 
14. Self monitoring and certification 




18. Information campaigns 
19. Dialogues with interested parties 
20. Industry led (design / installation) solutions 









The case study supported the view that GRID can provide a systematic framework for 
considering which strategies are most appropriate for different types of risk and regulatees.  
But, as noted above, it is important that regulators should also be able to assess their 
performance in an ongoing manner and to modify their approaches where necessary. We 
therefore developed a Good Regulatory Assessment Framework (GRAF) to provide a step by 
step process for enabling ‘double loop learning’ (Argyris & Schon 1978).  
GRAF operates on the basis of the same logical framework as the GRID. It asks 
regulators a series of questions that are designed to evaluate whether the GRID has been used 
appropriately in their agencies (the full GRAF is set out in SNIFFER 2011). Those 
completing the GRAF are thus asked to score, on a points scale, their agency’s performance 
on such matters as characterising accurately the types of low risks and  regulatees involved in 
a given low-risk area; in considering the strengths and weaknesses of the different 
intervention tools; in surveying the complete array of intervention options; in allowing tools 
to be used with appropriate intensity; and in assessing and modifying (where appropriate) 






 The GRAF’s scoring system is designed to allow managers quickly to pinpoint their 
areas of strength and weaknesses in selecting strategies for dealing with low-risk sites and 
activities. It also asks regulators to consider reasons for poor performance, and offers 
strategic managers the chance to identify possible improvements and to link reforms to 
feedback from field level officers.   
The GRAF requires quite subjective assessments: as such it is prey to abuse in a 
number of ways, for example routinisation, mechanistic decision making, gaming by those 
completing the assessment so that scores are just below the required thresholds for action, or 
simply ignoring it altogether.  We consider these challenges further in the next section.  It 
should be recognised, however, that any framework is prey to the same key vulnerability: it is 
not self-executing, rather its success depends on the willingness and ability of those using it 
to engage fully with the process. 
 
 
Challenging the Framework – will it work? 
 
As outlined above, the regulators of low risks face a number of challenges. They have to be 
clear about the risks they are prepared to tolerate if they are to secure desired outcomes and to 
preserve public confidence in their regimes. They have to evaluate low-risks with modest 
levels of resources. They have to deal with low-risks in a consistent manner and have to be 
able not only to assess their performance in relation to low-risks but to be prepared and able 
to justify this performance. In addition, they must be capable of responding to changes in the 
nature of risks without investing a disproportionate amount of resources on monitoring and 
analysis.  
The task of the project was to develop a framework for regulating low-risk sites that 
could be adopted by all four of the environmental agencies. One of the challenges in 
developing such a framework is that it has to be applicable to a wide range of different 
sectors and activities, and to the very different task environments of each of the agencies. It, 
furthermore, has to link to four very different sets of existing practices regarding risk 
analysis, risk scoring and enforcement.   
We therefore designed the GRID with the aim of creating a flexible decision-making 
tool which could the operational ‘middle ground’ between risk analysis and formal 
enforcement action. The broad implication of the GRID, nevertheless, is that, as risk-types 
move east on the GRID and firm-types move south, it is likely to be appropriate to apply 
enforcement strategies with increasing regulatory intensity. The agencies’ risk analysis 
processes provide the categorizations of the risk level of a site or activity, but do not provide 
a plan for intervention. The agencies’ enforcement guides provide guidance on when to use 
formal as opposed to informal enforcement actions, but do not provide a guide on what 
broader intervention strategies may be used as part of the regulatory process. Both the risk 
assessment frameworks and the enforcement guides emphasize risk and behavioural 
characteristics in their analytical frameworks, though with more weight given to risk 
characteristics than behaviour in the former and slightly more weight given to behavioural 
characteristics in the latter. In providing for a wide range of intervention strategies, and a 
matrix which combines risk and behavioural characteristics, the Framework is designed to 
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incorporate these two sets of driving factors in a way which enables regulators to develop 
strategies within a framework of ‘structured flexibility’.   
Will such a framework prove to be operable, dynamic, transparent and justifiable? 
The results of the Project’s third phase of research suggested that the GRID/GRAF system 
offered considerable potential if used astutely by regulators.
6
 The view from the regulatory 
practitioners was that, in integrating the two elements of risk and behavior, and in providing a 
broad range of intervention tools that could be used with respect to those in each category, 
the GRID provided an innovative matrix and a framework for structuring decision making 
about strategies for low-risk sites. It also allowed the regulators the flexibility to customize 
the GRID to reflect the particular expectations, costs and challenges encountered in specific 
sectors.  
The GRIF/GRAF system, it was concluded, offered greatest potential as a strategic 
planning tool, primarily at the sector level. Agencies could identify which sets of strategies 
were to be used in particular sectors, and then allow field officers to adjust strategic choices 
to some degree. The GRID, for example, could be used to design a sector intervention plan 
with concise guidance and a summary of main options for field officers to implement at the 
sub-sector level. Most interviewees thought that GRID could be used as part of an annual 
planning cycle, or a 2-3 year planning cycle over time, or as part of a periodic strategic 
review.   They suggested, moreover, that although the GRID/GRAF framework was designed 
with low risks in mind, it could be adapted to be used across a range of risks and at a number 
of different levels of decision making. 
A further conclusion was that agencies should populate the GRID themselves, rather 
than work to a set of strategies prescribed by others.  It was agreed that it would not be 
feasible or useful to provide a ‘master GRID’ thate which was populated with different 
strategies for each box, as it would not be applicable in all contexts and sectors. There were 
two main reasons for this view. Intervention tools vary in character according to their context 
– a surveillance intervention in the chemicals industry (or a sub-sector thereof) might operate 
quite differently from one in farming. Further, the resource implications of using tools may 
also vary dramatically from context to context. In some sectors there may be sets of existing 
arrangements (e.g. reporting systems, existing third party monitors or cooperation with other 
regulators) that would render the marginal costs of using these tools with respect to a 
particular type of risk quite small, whereas in another area these mechanisms might have to 
be established anew, making the strategy more costly and requiring a longer planning time.    
          Similar reasoning led to the widely supported conclusion that a single strategy for low 
risk sites would not be advisable.
7
 The range of sites, sectors, agency practices and the task 
environments of the agencies is such that a ‘single strategy’ approach would be unlikely to be 
suitable to all circumstances. Instead, the combination of the ‘structured flexibility’ of the 
GRID and accompanying Intervention Guide was preferred.   
 The key question, however, is whether the GRID/GRAF approach would work. One 
risk in using the GRID is that too many types of intervention tools will be suggested for a 
given combination of risk and regulatee type. A response to this challenge would be for each 
agency to consider develop a resourcing index tool to accompany the GRID. The GRID tool 
list might, thus, be coded by agencies to indicate whether tools are high, medium or low cost 
and a way to manage the allocation of resources would be to give regional managers a budget 
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so that this can be used as a basis for determining which strategies to use within the given 
constraints, and using the resourcing index as a guide. 
A further risk of the GRID is that its use would prove too costly and too complex, 
particularly for low risk sites or activities. In response, it can be argued that the combination 
of behavioral and risk characteristics in the GRID framework provides a structured approach 
that will help agencies to target their resources and intervention strategies appropriately. As 
noted above, there is a tension, however, between accuracy in mapping the regulated sites or 
activities onto the GRID, and the resources that are needed to do so. In the logic of a risk-
based framework, the amount of resources put into analyzing behavior has to be 
proportionate to the risks. For lower risks the mapping would, therefore, have to be ‘broad 




One way of refining the broad-brush approach to categorization would be to allow 
sector-level categorizations to be fine-tuned by field level officers if necessary.  Field officers 
could be allocated a prescribed set of tools but could be authorized to escalate their 
interventions if risks are not controlled acceptably - though they would have to justify this 
decision. GRID could also be the basis for useful discussions between field level officers and 
those in policy making roles within agencies regarding the types of intervention strategies 
that could best be adopted in different circumstances. This would address one of the findings 
discussed above: that those in different positions within the agencies have a very different 
view of its activities.
9
 
 Is there a danger that, in enabling such a flexible approach, the GRID/GRAF 
framework could lead to inconsistent and non-transparent decision making? On this point it 
can be argued that the framework offers regulators a means of fostering a consistent approach 
to regulating low risk sites or activities across the agency. As other organizations have found, 
peer panels can have a role in this respect when strategies are just being introduced - they are 
a way for the agency to develop a common language about risk, and to facilitate learning. The 
framework could also provide a good audit trail for decision making internally, and brings 
potential improvements in the transparency of decision-making. It also allows agencies to 
explain their regulatory strategies more fully to those being regulated and to other interested 
parties. It could be published on the agencies’ websites, for instance, and it could form part of 
a ‘decision letter’ or an open decision and decision communication tool.   
 Will the GRID/GRAF system produce excessively complex sets of decision 
frameworks, with one for lower risks and another for higher risks? This is a possibility, but 
the initial findings of the research described here suggests, however, that, although it was 
designed with lower risks in mind, GRID/GRAF offers potential as a strategic planning tool 
at all levels of risks. Agencies suggested that it could be extended beyond low risk sites into 
higher risks areas and applied as appropriate at the sector, sub-sector, or site level for all 
categories of risk. It could also be used at a pre-regulatory stage when discussing strategies 
with policy makers, or when discussing possible changes to existing legislation. In particular, 
the Framework could help to highlight the impacts of legislative decisions on regulators by 
making the regulators’ intervention choices clearer to policy makers in government.   
Furthermore, the assessment element of the framework, GRAF, could be challenged 
on the basis that it is too subjective and could fall prey to mechanical box-ticking. This is a 
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danger to be recognized, but much depends on how it is perceived and adopted within the 
agencies. Initial findings suggest that GRAF could provide a useful way to reflect on whether 
GRID had been used appropriately and that it could form part of a broader strategic review, at 
annual intervals or even longer. Agencies were positive about GRAF, and recognized that it 
was a framework for assessing the quality of consideration that was being given to different 
tools and strategies and their appropriateness in different cases. It was not a tool for 
evaluating the quality of front line regulation. A consensus was that it was important that 
GRAF was not a ‘tick box’ exercise. It would not have to be performed frequently but could 
be undertaken as part of a strategic review within the agency. GRAF could also be part of a 
cross-sector peer review or cross-agency peer review process to help establish a consistent 
view of risk within and across sectors and develop consistent strategy. In particular, peer 
panels could play a valuable role in developing a consistency of approach.    
The optimistic view is that agencies will use the GRID/GRAF framework to foster a 
wide-ranging conversation within the Agency regarding the strategies to be used with respect 
to different sectors – a conversation that will be fed into the decision and policy making 
processes that relate to lower risks.   These conversations could occur  within the agency both 
horizontally between sectors / regions and vertically, between officials at different levels 
within the organisation.  Agencies could also consider introducing peer panels for both GRID 
and GRAF, as noted above, particularly in the early stages, to facilitate the development of a 
consistent approach to assessing risks across and within sectors and / or regions. In 
implementing GRID/GRAF, consideration could be given to developing a system which 
would facilitate the use of the GRID – for example by containing links to the specific tools, 
resourcing index, and any ‘best practice’ comments that accumulate across the agency over 
time.  
GRID and GRAF could also be used as a basis for structuring conversations between 
agencies themselves, for example using inter-agency peer panels to work through case studies 
using GRID, or using GRAF as part of an intra- or inter-agency peer review process.
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 They 
could also be used to structure discussions both with policy officials in government or the 
Commission, and with regulated operators and other interested parties regarding the strategies 
that regulators should adopt to manage low risks.  By making the options clearer and the 
decisions more transparent, agencies could improve both their decision processes and what 
could be termed their ‘dynamic accountability’ - their engagement of a wider range of actors 
in decision-making. Using GRID/GRAF would also allow them to justify their chosen 
approaches more systematically than is currently possible within the normal ex post 
accountability processes to which they are subject.   
 
Conclusions:  Reframing Risk-Based Regulation 
 
Risk-based regulation seeks to calculate the risks attached to certain behaviours, 
structures or states of the world so that resources can be allocated accordingly. Although it is 
sold as a rationalistic and technocratic solution to a host of complex technical, social and 
political problems, in practice it is no such thing.   It can systemise decision making and 
render what is tacit explicit, but what it cannot in itself do, is provide a plan for what agencies 
should do.  It does not determine how to construct discrete ‘risks’ or suggest how risk 
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creators are to be dealt with in order to increase compliance or the furthering of statutory 
objectives. Nor does it indicate the right balance between attention to lower and higher risks, 
or short and long term gains; or guide regulators on managing the political and institutional 
consequences of their intervention decisions.  These are all matters of judgement which 
regulators have to make along the way. 
The Framework proposed here is principally proposed as one aspect of a risk- based 
governance framework.  As such, it runs with the grain of risk-based regulation strategies 
rather than call them fundamentally into question. The research process has, however, 
highlighted some of the complexities and tensions inherent in such strategies, and prompts 
some wider reflections on the project of risk-based regulation itself.   
 First, it is clear that how the risk is constructed and labelled by an agency is a highly 
complex process, in which, moreover, the scope for miscommunication is ripe.  What is ‘low 
risk’ in an agency’s risk-based framework, it should be remembered, is in fact code for what 
is ‘low priority’.  Criticising agency’s characterisations of what constitutes a ‘low risk’ as 
technically unsound, or criticising as unsound the related  assumption that low risks require 
low resources to be managed effectively, in effect misses the point and fails to understand the 
role that such risk categorisations play in an agency’s operational framework.  It fails, 
moreover, to recognise the reflexive relationship between the role that the risk categorisations 
play in an organisation’s operations, and how risks are in fact constructed and assessed.  It is 
commonplace in risk regulation to note the significance of how risks are configured and 
bundled for how they are managed, but the detailed intra-organisational research done for this 
project highlights the additional role of factors such as funding structures, legal mandates, 
and internal organisational politics in that risk construction and categorisation process. A 
perennially attractive assumption is that risks should be categoriesd before resource decisions 
are made, but, in practice, the two processes operate in tandem, with tensions surrounding  
decisions on how to organise risks (by site or activity) and whether to target biggest risks or 
those where there are the greatest  possibilities for risk reduction at the lowest cost. 
   Second, although risk based regulation frameworks tend to impose unified sets of 
assessments which apply across risks in the regulator’s remit, there is an argument for seeing 
low and high risk regulation as enterprises that differ in some important respects, rather than 
as the same game played with different stakes. It is true that, in some regards, low-risk 
regulation resembles higher risk regulation. Thus, in relation to all levels of risk, the 
regulators will have to be clear about their objectives and will have to come to grips with 
such familiar challenges as those of identifying and evaluating risks, of establishing priorities, 
dealing with potentially systemic issues, coping with change and evaluating and modifying 
performance. The above discussion, nevertheless, reveals that the conceptual, practical and 
political challenges of low-risk regulation are, at least in some significant ways, quite distinct 
from those that arise with respect to higher risks. 
 Third, these variations of challenge stem in no small way from a central difference 
between the processes of controlling lower and higher risks. High risk targeting is a 
‘mainstream’ activity – this is what risk-based regulation is supposed to be about. Low risk 
regulation, in contrast, can be viewed as something close to an aberration: an activity that 
needs to be specially justified. It has, moreover, to be justified without devoting significant 
analytical resources to this task – since, by definition, the risks at issue do not merit the 
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application of material levels of resource. The product of these two factors is that the 
processes of justifying low-risk regulation can take on a different character from those 
encountered with higher risks. Most notably, the balance between different forms of 
justificatory argument can differ. Risk targeting appears to place considerable weight on 
rational-technical reasoning. Priorities are established with reference to the risk-scoring 
regime that underpins and drives the system. With low risks, however, the logical 
consequences of the risk scoring rationale are less acceptable to a public which expects to 
receive universal standard of protection of all risks, and may not accept that their particular 
concerns are not as a high a priority for the agency as they are for them.  The game of 
justification and legitimation therefore changes in character. Rather than being rationalistic, it 
has to become more of an exercise in managing expectations and creating assurance – most 
notably that low levels of regulatory intervention are not allowing excessive risks to be run or 
to develop. The balance favors political deliberations rather than technical ones - and this 
point applies to the agency’s internal as well as its external politics.   This finding is in 
contrast to other risk governance frameworks which suggest that such dialogic processes 
should be reserved for complex and uncertain risks (eg IRGC 2005).  The research here has 
emphasised that it is necessary even for simpler risks.  The particular challenges of playing 
the low-risk, as opposed to the high-risk game mean that, in the former, it may be equally, if 
not more, appropriate to pay attention to the more political aspects of strategic choices. 
Finally, the nature of the challenges of justifying regulation can change across levels 
of risks. As argued, it may be that the balance between rational-technical and political 
deliberations is quite different in higher and lower risk regulation, and in ways which are not 
commonly assumed. Regulatory conversations, as a result, may display different 
characteristics across risk levels. It follows that, since most regulators will have to control 
risks of many different kinds and severities, they will have to justify their actions, not by 
engaging in a single rationalistic conversation or game with respect to all their activities, but 
by playing a cluster of games that are contentious, dynamic and which impact on each other 
in often unpredictable ways, but which ultimately have to be funded from the same pool of 
resources.   
Thus, although the exercise engaged in during this research project was a technical, 
prescriptive one, an awareness of the particular issues that arise in the regulation of low risks 
compels us to reassess attitudes to risk-based regulation more broadly. It does so, not least, by 
emphasizing that risk-based regulation cannot be viewed in any way as a mechanical and 
uncontentious approach that targets the highest risks and allocates priorities accordingly. 
Decisions regarding the balance of priorities between higher and lower risks are both 
contentious and shaped by particular conceptualizations of risk.  The bad news, for those who 
are attracted to modes of numerical quantification, is that these matters are largely 
insusceptible of such determination and require the exercise of managerial and political 
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 The HMRC’s Compliance Continuum seeks to capture the behavioral characteristics 
of all traders, from the compliant to the fraudulent, and to categorize each trader into one of 
seven categories: deliberate evader, avoider, chancer, failure, new business, trier and 
compliant. Each firm is assigned to a category, and that categorization in turn is used to order 
the HMRC’s inspection and enforcement policy (Black 2008; HMRC 2009). The Australian 
Tax Office has adopted a similar approach. It commissioned research to find out why people 
did and did not pay tax. Based on this analysis, it then adjusted its practices for 
communicating with tax payers and its intervention strategies to fit the ‘motivational posture’ 
or attitude of the different groups of tax payers (Braithwaite et al. 2007; Leviner 2008). 
 
2
 A critical issue, however, is whether regulators should expend resources on those 
operators that are likely to be most responsive to their attentions (the ‘easy wins’) or on those 
most likely not to comply (the ‘hard cases’). A focus on easy wins can mean that the more 
intractable operators are effectively unregulated and those who are inclined to comply may 




 The intensity issue concerns the levels of resources put into enforcement, the severity 
of the sanctions pursued and the enforcement strategies favored – be these escalatory, 
behavior-targeted, risk-based or other systems. 
 
4
 ‘High capacity’ to comply is used as shorthand and refers to a business that is well 
informed, well resourced, and well organized to foster compliance.  For a similar definition 
see Renn 2005. 
 
5
 The ranking of both of risk and regulatee types was a matter of some debate in the 
course of the project. It was concluded that those who were less motivated and had a low 
capacity to comply required regulating at a greater intensity than those who were less 
motivated but possessed a higher capacity to comply. The reason was that, with respect to 
those who had an existing capacity to comply, the agencies’ main challenge was to make 
them motivated, whereas those with a lower motivation combined with a lower capacity 
required the agency to address both motivation and capacity (for example through technical 
capacity building) and that this would demand more resources. Reversing the bottom two 
categories may be appropriate in different sectors, e.g. where there is a high potential for 
‘gaming’ the rules. 
 
6
 This stage of the research consisted of qualitative interviews with senior officials from 
the four environmental regulators, regulatees, government officials and NGOs in England & 
Wales, Northern Ireland, Scotland and Eire. Main issues explored were concerns were 
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whether the framework was too complex, too resource intensive, whether it could be adapted 
to fit the very different operational systems and environmental contexts of the different 
regulators, and whether (as we hoped) it could extend beyond low risks to be used across all 
the agencies’ activities. 
 
7




 Categorizations, moreover, would have to be reviewed as regulatees can move 
between boxes. Indeed, it may be that changes in strategy (such as reductions in inspections) 
may cause such movements. These shifts pose resourcing challenges of their own. 
 
9
 It was also noted by the agencies that policy level determination of the strategies that 
should be used, and of the appropriate regulatory intensity to be adopted, could give 
protection to field officers if they were to be criticized for changes in regulatory action and 
priority.   
 
10
 The Agencies involved could, for example, extend GRID/GRAF beyond the 
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